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RUTH TRUST, Appellant, v. ARDEN FARMS COMPANY 
(a Corporation) et at, R{lspondents. 
[1] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Control of Instrumentality.-
A plaintiff seeking to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
against a defendant who at a time prior to the accident has 
relinquished all control of the instrumentality causing the 
injury must affirmatively establish that the condition of the 
. instrumentality has not changed since it left defendant's 
possession. 
[2] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.-The mere break-
ing of a milk bottle in a customer's possession while handling 
it cannot give rise to an inference that the dairy delivering 
the bottle was negligent in failing to discover the defect. 
[3] Id.-Exercise of Oare by Vendors.-A dairy is not responsible 
for defects in milk bottles that cannot be fonnd by a reason-
able, practicable inspection. 
[4] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.-In an action 
by a customer against a dairy and a bottle manufacturer 
for injuries sustained by the customer when a milk bottle 
broke in her hand, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was not appli-
cable as to the dairy where the customer failed to present any 
evidence to negate maltreatment of the bottle by her or her 
three boys after its delivery three days before the accident, 
there being evidence that she had removed the bottle at least 
once and used some of its contents during that period, and 
that her husband and boys had access to the refrigerator. 
[6] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.-In an action by 
a eustomeragainst a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for 
injuries sustained by the customer when a milk bottle broke in 
her hand, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was not applicable as 
to tbe manufacturer where there was no evidence that the 
bottle was not mishandled or its"condition changed after it 
passed from the manufacturer's control. 
~' 
[1] See OaI.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 313 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negli-
gence, § 300. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 332 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negli-
gence, § 306 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Negligence, § 136; [2,4,5,7] Negli-
gence, § 138; [3] Negligence, § 56; [6] Sales, § 290; [8] Food, 
§ 1.1(3); [9] Food, § 8(6); [10, 12] Negligence, § 125; [11] Evi-
dence, § 156(3); [13] Evidence, § 453; [14] Evidence, § 457 [15] 
Trial, § 62. 
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[6] Sales-Breach of Warrant)'-Evidence.-In an action by • 
customer against a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for in-
juries sustained by the customer when a milk bottle broke in 
her hand, there was no basis for claiming any breach of war-
ranty on the part of the dairy where there was no evidence 
that t~e bottle was defective when delivered by it to the cus-
tomer. 
[7] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breach of Warrant)'.-The 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negli-
gence and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty. 
[8] Food-Regulation-Kilk-Oontainers.-In an action by a cus-
tomer against a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries 
sustained by the customer when a milk bottle broke in her 
hand, it was not shown that either defendant had breached 
any of the provisions of Agr. Code, § 701, relating to care and 
use of containers, where there was no evidence that the bottle 
was not "sound, smooth and free from rust" as required by the 
code section when delivered by the dairy to the customer's 
porch, the only evidence coming from the customer's expert 
who testified that the bottle had a "thin" area around the top 
but that it did not make the bottle unsafe for the use to which 
the dairy applied it. 
[9] Id.-Evidence.-In an action by a customer against a dairy 
and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by the cus-
tomer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, it was not error 
to exclude evidence that there were other containers for milk, 
where this evidence was immaterial to any issue before the 
court. 
[10] Negligence-Evidence.-In an action by a customer against 
a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by 
the customer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, it was 
proper to exclude evidence that the dairy had delivered six 
allegedly defective bottles to the customer's home during the 
six months following the accident. 
[11] Evidence-Relevancy-Other Acc1dents.-Generally, evidence 
of subsequent accidents has no probative tendency to show that 
defendant in a personal injury case might reasonably have 
anticipated the previous accident, and such evidence is inad-
missible. 
[12] Negligence-Evidence.-In an action by a customer against 
a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by 
the customer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, it was 
proper to exclude expert testimony as to whether the bottle 
was safe and what the standards for milk bottles ought to be 
[11] See Oal.Jur.Sd, Evidence, I§ 143-145; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
ISM. 
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where the bottle had stood the test of several months' use 
and the witness testified that it had no defect that was appar-
ent or could be demonstrated or established and also admitted 
that he had no prior experience with milk bottles or the dairy 
trade; no foundation was laid for testimony from him regard-
ing what the standards of safety for milk bottles were. 
[13] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Quali1ications of Expert Wit-
nesses.-An expert is not qualified as a witness unless it is 
shown that he is familiar with the standards required under 
similar circumstances. 
[14] Id.-Opinion Evidence-Qualifications of Expert Witnesses.-
The trial court's ruling on the sufficiency of qualification of 
an expert will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a 
showing of abuse of discretion. 
[16] Trial-View by .Tury.-In an action by a customer against a 
dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by the 
customer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, the trial co~ 
did not err in denying the customer's request that the jury be 
permitted to inspect the manufacturer's premises, this being a 
matter of discretion for the trial court under Code Civ. Proe., 
§ 610, and there being no showing that denial of inspection 
constituted an abuse of discretion. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Edward R. Brand, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action against a dairy and a glass manufacturer for per-
sonal injuries resulting from a milk bottle breaking in cus-
tomer's hand. Judgment of nonsuit affirmed. 
Jerrold A. Fadem for Appellant. 
Belcher, Kearney & Fargo, Louis E. Kearney, Gibson, Dunn 
& Crutcher, Ira C. Powers, Sherman Welpton, Jr., and Stein-
hart, Goldberg, Feigenbaum.& Ladar for Respondents. 
McCOMB, J.-This -is"an action for damages for personal 
injuries suffered by plaintiff when a milk bottle she was 
handling in her kitchen broke as she was in the process of 
setting it down on a tile drainboard. 
Defendants are Arden Farms Company, hereinafter called 
"Arden," and Owens-Illinois Glass Company, hereinafter 
called "Owens." 
Owens manufactured a milk bottle which Arden filled with 
skim milk and delivered to plaintiff by placing it on her porch 
) 
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on a Thursday morning. Plaintiff took the milk bottle into 
her home and stored it in a refrigerator. 
On the Sunday following the Thursday delivery of the 
bottle of skim milk here involved, plaintiff was in the process 
of setting the bottle, half filled with milk, down on a tile 
drain board when it broke, and she sustained cuts about the 
wrist. 
The trial court granted defendants' motions for a nonsuit. 
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment, presenting these ques-
tions : 
First: Was the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable 
under the facts of this case as to (a) defendant Arden or (b) 
defendant Ou'ens' 
No. [1] A plaintiff seeking to invoke the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur against a defendant who at a time prior to the 
accident has relinquished all control of the instrumentality 
causing the injury must affirmatively establish that the con-
dition of the instrumentality has not changed since it left the 
possession of defendant. (Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, 
Ltd.,46 Cal.2d 190, 195 [7] [293 P.2d 26] ; Burr v. Sherwin 
Williams Co., 42 Ca1.2d 682, 691 [10] [268 P.2d 1041]; 
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 458 12] [150 
P.2d 436].) 
The rule is accurately stated by Mr. Chief Justice Gibson 
in Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 8upra, as follows: "The 
instructions given, however, were erroneous in that, while they 
purported to state all the conditions under which res ipsa 
loquitur would be applicable, they did not inform the jury 
that plaintiffs must show that the instrumentality which 
caused the damage was not mishandled or its condition otker-
we changed ofter control was relinquished by the person 
against whom the doctrine is to be opplied." (Italics added.) 
[2] In Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Ca1.2d 614, 618 [3] 
[140 P.2d 369], this court said: "The mere breaking of the 
bottle alone cannot give rise to an inference that defendant 
was negligent in failing to discover the defect. [3] While 
the dairy may have had a duty to make an examination of all 
bottles, whether newly purchased or returned by prior cus-
tomers, it is not responsible for defects that cannot be found 
by a reasonable, practicable inspection. (Citations.) In the 
present case there is no evidence that a feasible means of 
discovering the defect or flaw was available to this defendant. 
The language of the court in Loebig's Guardian v. Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co., 259 Ky. 124 [81 S.W.2d 910], is particularly 
) 
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appropriate. In holding that res ipsa loquitur 'R n~t appli-
cable to thf\ explosion of a coca-cola bottle, the GOurt eaid 
(pp. 911-912) : 'The defendant was not, under the circum-
stances, an insurer, and it was not shown that there was any 
more reasonably practicable method of inspection used in the 
industry than the method of inspection admittedly adopted 
by the defendant. Suppose the bottle was defective. A con-
clusion of negligence could not arise without some showing 
that the defect could have been discovered by the exercise of 
ordinary care. • • . In the instant case we are still left to 
conjecture as to the cause of. the defect in the bottle and 
its contents or whether it was such a defect as might have 
been discovered by a more thorough inspection. Unless we 
are prepared to hold defendant as an insurer, it is hard to see 
how else it could be held responsible without some showing that 
its opportunity to exercise care was in some measure propor-
tionate to the duty imposed-without some showing that a 
more thorough inspection would have been dective. Plain-
tiff's experts suggest various methods of testing bottles which 
might be applied, but' it is not shown that. these tests are 
commercially practicable or that they would have disclosed 
the complained-of defect .... We must meBSlJre the duty 
by ordinary standards and by consequences reasonably to be 
anticipated. Subject to these criteria, it is clear that the 
proof falls short of raising any inference of negligence. ' 
"In Licari v. Markotos, 110 Misc. 334 [180 N.Y.S. 278], 
the court held a bottler not liable for injuries caused by 
breaking of a bottle of a non-explosive cleaning and dyeing 
preparation, saying (p.280 [N.Y.S.]): 'Nor is there any force 
in respondent's contention, strenuously urged upon this ap-
peal, that the defendant failed in his duty to inspect the 
bottles before filling them; this for the reason that there is no 
proof that any examination or inspection would have found 
the existence of any defect. U such had been the case, it was 
the plaintiff's duty to ~ve evidence thereof. BruckeZ v. 
J. Milltau's Son, 116 Api>. Div. [832] 836 [102 N.Y.S. 395]. 
In the absence of such evidence, the learned trial justice had 
no foundation upon which to predicate any finding of negli-
gence on defendant's part, and a judgment for plaintiff could 
be based on none other than speculation and pure guess-
work.'" . 
[4] <a) With reference to Arden, the record discloses that 
on the day the bottle in question, filled with skim milk, had 
been delivered to plaintiff's porch, plaintiff had carried the 
) 
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container holding that bottle and other bottles of milk into 
the house, wiped the bottles, and put them in the refrigerator. 
All bottles of milk were stored on one wire shelf in the refrig-
f'rator, which shelf held eight bottles. The average daily 
delivery of milk to plaintiff's home was four bottles. When 
plaintiff had placed the bottles of fresh milk on this shelf, she 
followed her custom of moving the bottles of older milk 
forward on the shelf and storing the bottles of fresh milk 
behind them. To this procedure there was one exception.-
the bottle of skim milk received in the delivery was always 
kf'pt at the front of the shelf. 
The acddent occurred on Sunday, March 7, 1954, and 
involved the bottle of skim milk delivered the preceding 
Thursday. Between the time of the delivery of the particular 
bottle of skim milk and the time of the accident, the bottle 
had been removed at least once by plaintiff and some of the 
contents used. Plaintiff had three children, aged 10, 9 and 
5 at the time of the accident, each of whom had access to the 
milk in the refrigerator. The skim milk bottle was identified 
for the children by a band placed around the neck of the 
bottle by plaintiff. 
From the foregoing evidence, it is clear that any of plain-
tiff's three children, having as they did access to the refrig-
erator at all times, may have struck the bottle of skim milk 
with another bottle and damaged it prior to the time of the 
accident, or it may in some other manner or fashion have been 
damaged. 
The children were not called as witnesses to negate mal-
treatment of and damage to the bottle by them prior to the 
time of the accident. Plaintiff's husband, who also had access 
to the refrigerator, was called as a witness, but he made no 
attempt to show that the bottle had not been damaged after 
it had been received and prior to the time of the accident. 
From the foregoing evidence, it is clear that the above 
stated rule was not met in the present case and that there 
is a complete hiatus as to what, if anything, happened to the 
bottle between the time it was placed in the refrigerator by 
plaintiff and the time the injury occurred. Hence, the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable to the facts of 
this ease. 
[6] (b) With reference to Owens, there is a total absence 
of any evidence that the bottle was not mishandled or its 
condition changf'd after it passf'd from Owens' control. 
Since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable 
) 
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and there was a total absence of any evidence of negligence 
upon the part of either defendant, the nonsuit was properly 
granted. 
[6] Second: Was there a breach of warranty upon the part 
of Arden'1 
No. There was no evidence that the bottle was defective 
when delivered by Arden to plaintiff, and therefore there is no 
basis for claiming any breach of warranty. [7] The doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence 
and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty. 
(Oregon Auto-Dispatch v. Portland Oordage 00., 51 Ore. 583 
[95 P. 498, 499] ; Poovey v. International Sugar Feed No.2 
00.,191 N.C. 722 [133 S.E. 12, 14 [3,4]] ; Stonebrink v. High-
land Motors, 171 Ore. 415 [137 P.2d 986, 990] ; cf. Gerber v. 
Faber, 54 Ca1.App.2d 674, 686 [4] et seq. [129 P.2d 485].) 
[8] Third: Was there any evidence that defendants, 0,. 
either of them, breached any of the provisions of section '101 
of the Agricultural 00det2 
No. There was no evidence that the bottle in question was 
not C C sound, smooth and free from rust" as rt'quired by 
section 701 of the Agricultural Code when delivered by Arden 
to plaintiff's porch. The only evidence on this subject came 
from plaintiff's expert, who testified that the bottle had a 
SPlaintift' and defendant Owens stipulated that plaintiff had no C&WIe 
of action for a breach of warranty against defendant Owens. 
·Section 701 of the Agriculturlll Code reads: 
Ie (a) Every restaurant, sehool, hospital, BOda fountain or other plaee 
where food or drink is lerved to the public, which sells milk, cream, iee 
eream, ice milk, buttermilk or any combination thereof for consumption 
on the premises, upon emptying the containers thereof, which are to be 
:returned to the milk distributor or manufacturer, shall caule such eon· 
tainers, elI:cept gl8.118 containers, to be rinsed and drained. 
"(b) All containers of milk, cream or producta thereof which are 
delivered to the eonsumer by any retailer or distributor and which are 
to be returned to such retailer or distributor shall be rinsed and drained 
before they are returned. ._ 
•• (e) All containers exceptiingle serviee containers of any kind 
in which milk or any produet of milk is kept, stored, transported or 
delivered, shall be sound, smooth, free from rust or open seams and at 
all times kept in a condition which will permit thorough clE'ansing of 
all Burfaces with which the milk or its products come in contact. Con-
tainers including iee cream cabin eta commonly used or intended for the 
reception, storage or delivery of milk, cream or products thereof shall be 
used exclusively for the storsge and use of milk and milk products and 
ahall not be used for any other purpose. All empty containers delivered 
to any producer, manufacturer, retailer or distributor for the reception 
of milk or any product of milk shall be kept in a clean, sanitary, and 
sterile condition and shall be used for no other purpose." 
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"thin" area around the top but that it did not make such 
bottle unsafe for the use to which Arden applied it.' 
[9] Fourth: Did the trial court err in excluding olered 
et1idence' 
No. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in not 
permitting her to introduce evidence: 
(a> That there were other containers for milk such as round 
bottles, stippled bottles, cardboard cartons, and others. 
This evidence was clearly immaterial to any issue before 
the court. Although glass is subject to breakage, it has many 
qualities as a food container which no paper container can 
fulfill, e.g., lower porosity, impermeability to odor, transpar-
ency, and cleanliness. 
[10] (b) That Arden had delivered six allegedly defective 
milk bottles to plaintill"s home during the six months follow-
ing the accident. 
This evidence was also properly excluded. [Ul It is the 
general rule that evidence of subsequent accidents has no 
probative tendency to show that a defendant might reasonably 
have anticipated the previous accident, and therefore such 
evidence is inadmissible. (McOormick v. Great Western Power 
00.,214 Cal. 658, 668 [5]. [8 P.2d 145, 81 A.L.R. 678].> 
[It] Fifth: Did the triaZ court unduly limit the examina.-
tion of the expert witness, Benson' 
No. Plaintiff contends that the witness should have been 
permitted to testify as to whether the bottle was safe and what 
the standards for milk bottles ought to be. 
This testimony was properly excluded for the reason that 
the bottle had stood the test of at least several months' use 
and the witness testified that the bottle had no defect that 
'Was apparent or could be demonstrated or established. He 
also admitted that he had had no prior experience with milk 
bottles or the dairy trade. Therefore, no foundation was laid 
for testimony from him regarding what the standards of 
safety for milk bottles were. 
[13, 1'] The rule is settled that an expert is not qualified 
as a witness unless it is shown that he is familiar with the 
"The witneee testified: 
"The Court: (Interrupting) There Im't aD1 question but what thbIIler 
glaBs is more susceptible to breakage thaD thicker glass, but is it of 
n.cb a degree that it would make the bottle, as a unit, unsafe, or have 
an effect on its I&fet1-have aD effect on its I&fet1 tor the 1lH for 
whleh it is intended? 
"The Witneee: J woulc1D't 111.1 that, u." 
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standards required under similar circumstances (Huffmq.n v. 
Lindquist, 37 Cal.2d 465, 476 [9] [234 P.2d 34, 29 A.L.R.2d 
485]) ; also, that the trial court's ruling upon the sufficiency 
of the qualification of an expert will not be disturbed on 
appeal in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. 
(Beres/ord v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 45 Ca1.2d 738, 749 [13] 
[290 P.2d 498, 54 A.L.R.2d 910]; Bennett v. Los ,Angeles 
Tumor Institute, 102 Cal.App.2d 293,296 [4] [227 P.2d 473] ; 
Budat v. Carithers, 137 Cal.App. 92, 97 [3] [30 P.2d 435].) 
In the present case the evidence did not meet the above 
requirements. 
[15] Sixth: Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's 
request that the jury be permitted to inspect Owens' premises' 
No. Section 610 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: 
"When, in the opinion of the Court, it is proper for the jury 
to have a view of the property which is the subject of litiga-
tion, or of the place in which any material fact occurred, it 
may order them to be conducted, in a body, under the charge 
of an officer, to the place, which shall be shown to them by 
some person appointed by the Court for that purpose. While 
the jury are thus absent, no person, other than the person 
so appointed, shall speak to them on any subject connected 
with the trial." (Italics added.) 
It is thus evident that the matter of inspection is left to 
the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the absence of 
a showing of abuse of discretion, as in the present case, the 
trial court's denial of an inspection will not be disturbed on 
appeal. (Nunneley v. Edgar HoteZ, 86 Cal.2d 493, 501 [6] 
[225 P.2d 497] ; Laguna Salada etc. Dist. v. Pacific DetJ. Co., 
119 Cal.App.2d 470, 477 [14] [259 P.2d 498].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Concurrmg and Dissenting.-I concur in the 
judgment insofar ~ !t sustains the granting of nonsuit as to 
Owens-Illinois Glass Company, but disagree with a similar 
conclusion reached in connection with defendant Arden 
Farms. 
The majority concludes that plaintiff failed to present any 
evidence to negate maltreatment of the bottle by her and her 
family after its delivery, and thus, the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur does not apply. It is also held that there is no 
evidence to support a finding of breach of warranty since no 
1tCM-4 
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defect in the bottle had been shown to exist. On the basis 
of the facts as stated in the majority opinion these conclUl';icms 
are warranted. However, it is submitted that there are 
material omissions in the majority's factual statement, which, 
when viewed according to the rule ou nonsuit, renders such 
conclusions erroneous. 
The record reveals that plaintiff established the following 
uncontroverted facts. The bottle in question was manufac-
tured by Owens sometime in 1953; part of the manufacturing 
process required that Arden's name be written on the bottle. 
Shortly thereafter the bottle was sent to Arden and used in 
their business of delivering milk for the months preceding the 
time of breaking in 1954. At the manufacturing stage bottles 
are subjected to a test for visual defects, and in addition, 
manufacturer Owens conducts statistical tests for latent de-
fects. These statistical tests consist of taking a certain number 
of bottles from the production line and subjecting them to 
thermal-shock impact tests which reveal any latent defects. 
This test is regarded as 95-98 per cent effective in insuring 
th.at the remaining bottles not so tested will be free from 
hidden defects. At the bottling level, Arden inspects new as 
well as returned bottles for visual defects to discover any 
damage that might have occurred in shipping or while in use, 
but no test is maintained to discover latent defects. 
Plaintiff's expert witness testified that he had examined 
the reconstructed parts of the broken bottle and that the cause 
of the bottle's breaking was impact, but that from {)bserving 
the fragmentation pattern of the percussion eone and the 
absence of spalling (chipping and shattering) the' eontact 
was extremely mild. He further stated that an analysis of 
the fragmentation pattern led him to the conclusion that the 
bottle could have only broken because of a defect. His study 
indicated that the defect was at the base of . the bottle, but 
it was impossible to determine its precise nature. 
Plaintiff's milk delivery consisted of four quarts of milk, 
including a quart of skim milk, every other day, which was 
placed on a refrigerator shelf having space for eight quarts. 
The quart of skim milk being distinguished from the other 
hottles by a blue rubber band placed around its neck. 
As to· the treatment of the bottle after it was delivered, 
plaintiff testified that she was always careful with the milk 
bottles, and that the skim milk while kept on the same shelf 
as the homogenized milk was apart from it, permitting access 
to .the homogenized milk without disturbing the skim milk. 
Apr. 1958] TRUST fJ. ARDEN FARMS Co. 
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Plaintiif also stated that no member of her family, including 
the children, had ever broken any bottles, and that no one 
but herself used the skim milk. No objection was made to the 
evidence of past acts of due care. 
The question before this court is whether disregarding con-
flictingevidence, giving to the plaintiff's evidence all the 
value to which it is legally entitled, and indulging in every 
legitimate inference which may be drawn from that evidence, 
the evidence is of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict 
in favor of plaintiif (see Leonard v. Watsonville Community 
Hospital,47 Ca1.2d 509, 514-515 [305 P.2d 36]). 
Reading the evidence presented against the background -of 
this rule, it must be concluded that plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case against Arden based upon three possible 
theories: (1) negligence by invoking the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur; (2) negligence by proof of specific acts; and (3) 
breach of warranty, rendering the nonsuit improper in this 
regard. However, as to Owens, plaintiff has failed to estab-
lish a prima facie case based either on the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur or specific acts of negligence, and since plaintiff 
stipulated that no breach of warranty action existed against 
Owens the granting of the nonsuit in this respect was proper. 
In connection with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it may 
be invoked where (1) defendant had exclusive control of the 
instrumentality causing the injury, and (2) the accident is of 
such a nature that it ordinarily would not occur in the 
absence of negligence of defendant (see Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co., 24 Ca1.2d 453, 457-458 [150 P.2d 436]). The 
exclusive control requirement is modified to the extent that 
if defendant had control at the time of the alleged negligent 
act and plaintiif proves that the condition of the instrumen-
tality causing the injury had not changed after it left defend-
ant's possession, then plaintiif may avail himself of the 
doctrine providing the other-eondition is satisfied (see Honea 
v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Ca1.2d 614, 617-618 [140 P.2d 369] ; 
Escola v. Coca Cola Boftling Co., supra, 458). The extent of 
plaiptiif's burden of proving that the condition of the instru-
mentality is unchanged is fully discussed in Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., supra, 458-459, where it is stated:" It is 
not necessary, of course, that plaintiff eliminate every remote 
possibility of injury to the bottle after defendant lost control, 
and the requirement is satisfied if there is evidence permitting 
a reasonable inference that it was not accessible to extraneous 
harmful forces and that it was carefully handled by plaintiff 
) 
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or any third person who may have moved or touched it. [Cita-
tion.] If such evidence is presented, the question becomes 
one for the trier of fact [citation], and accordingly, the issue 
should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions." 
(See also Zentz v. Coca Cola BottZing Co., 39 Ca1.2d 436, 
444 [247 P.2d 344].) 
Contrary to the majority opinion there is evidence which 
(~an form the basis of a reasonable inference that the condition 
of the bottle had not changed. Plaintiff testified that she 
handled the bottle with due care. This evidence is suflicient 
to satisfy the requirement that the bottle had not changed 
insofar as plaintift's handling is concerned (see Honea v. City 
Dairy, Inc., supra, 618). While there is no direct evidence that 
the bottle was carefully handled by third persons having 
access to it, there is circumstantial evidence on which a 
reasonable inference can be predicated that these persons 
exercised due care in handling the milk bottle, if they handled 
it at all. Plaintiff stated that no one in her family had ever 
broken a bottle. She added that the bottle was not used by 
any other member of her family. Such sole use being guaran-
teed by the fact the bottle was designated by a blue rubber 
band, its purpose known to all members of the household. It 
was further established that while all the milk bottles were 
kept on the same shelf, the skim was kept "apart" from the 
homogenized milk. It may be inferred from the fact that the 
shelf had space for eight bottles, and only four were delivered 
every other day, that being "apart" was or suflicient degree 
that access to the homogenized milk was possible without 
disturbing the skim milk. From the combination of the facts 
that the skim milk was used only by plaintiff, and that no 
member of the family had ever broken a bottle, plus the in-
ference that the skim milk was "apart" permitting access 
to other bottles, a jury could reasonably conclude that the 
third persons did not touch the skim milk or if they did it was 
done with due care. 
Having met the burden of showing that her conduct and 
her family's action did not in any way deviate from the exer-
cise of due care, which consequently excludes the possibility 
of the accident being caused by plaintiff or her family, plain-
tiff can now invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur by show-
ing that the manner in which the bottle was broken does not 
ordinarily happen without negligence for which Arden is 
probably responsible. 
The substantive content of this requirement has been vari-
) 
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able, and it is necessary to review the cases discussing it. As 
a preliminary point all cases agree that bottlers of beverages, 
including dairies, have a duty of care to inspect bottles 
whether newly purchased or returned by prior customers (see 
Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., supra, 618; Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co., supra, 460; Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 
Ca1.2d 514, 517 [203 P.2d 522] ; Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co., supra, 448). In Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., supra, it was 
held that the breaking of a milk bottle is alone insufficient 
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to permit the additional 
and necessary inference of negligence by defendant, either in 
causing the defective condition or in failing to discover it by 
proper inspection. However, in reaching this conclusion a 
rule was suggested that where plaintiff can demonstrate that 
there was a defect and there were reasonable means of dis-
covering the defect in the exercise of due care, then this 
constitutes sufficient evidence from which to infer that it is 
more probable than not defendant was negligent in failing 
to discover the defect. This suggested rule was adopted in 
Escola v. Coca Cola BottUng Co., supra, 458, and again in 
Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., supra. In the Escola case this 
court permitted the application of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur after plaintiff had established that no unreasonable 
extraneous force had acted upon the bottle subsequent to 
delivery, and upon the ground there was an inference that 
defendant failed to exercise due care in inspecting the bottle 
since it could be determined from the evidence that the bottle 
had a visual defect that could have been ascertained by a 
reasonable inspection. The evidence relied upon to create 
such an inference dealt with the inspection methods in the 
industry. Following the Escola case this court was faced with 
a similar question in Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., supra, and 
the Escola rule was followed. To summarize the law as it 
existed after the Aztec Brewfng Company case, plaintiff was 
entitled to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in cases 
involving bursting or breaking bottles where (1) there was 
a showing that no external harmful force touched the bottle 
after leaving defendant's control and (2) where evidence was 
presented that the bottle contained a defect that could be 
discovered by a practicable and reasonable inspection. 
In Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra, the former re-
quirement was retained while the latter was altered materially. 
The rule this court announced therein stated that plaintiff 
may invoke the res ipsa loquitur doctrine where he introduces 
) 
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evidence sufticient to warrant an inference that the bottle was 
not mistreated subsequent to its delivery by defendant and 
where the accident was of such a nature that it can be said, in 
the light of past experience, that it probably was the result 
of negligence by someone and defendant is probably the per-
son who is responsible (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra, 
446). The C!lurt determined that if plainti1f demonstrated 
that he was not an intervening cause, the happening of the 
exploding bottle gave rise to an inference of negligent con-
duct on the part of the defendant. This ruling leads to the 
conclusion that it is no longer necessary to present evidence 
that the defect could have been discovered by a practicable 
and reasonable inspection before the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur may be invoked. The test now is whether from the 
happening of the accident it is more probable than not that 
defendant was negligent. 
Applying this rule to the case at bar it is clear that an 
inference of negligence arises from the breaking of the bottle. 
Plainti1f has established that no harmful intervening forces 
touched the bottle after it left defendant's control; common 
experience tells us that glass milk bottles, when handled as 
plainti1f did, do not ordinarily break, and since Arden has 
a duty to inspect bottles for visual defects, it is more probable 
that a dangerous bottle was placed on the market by a negli-
gent act of Arden, and it is, therefore, responsible for the 
damage caused. Moreover, in this case we have expert testi-
mony that the bottle broke as a result of a defect, which 
renders the inference that defendant was negligent in either 
wholly failing to inspect the bottle, or in failing to make a 
reasonable inspection all the more probable. This probability 
is further underscored by the principle that the possibility 
of the defect in the bottle being latent and not visually dis-
coverable is regarded as insufficient to prevent the application 
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bot-
lUng Co., '''Fa, 449). . 
I am unconvinced by the distinction attempted to be drawn 
in the Zentz case between bottles that contain carbonated bev-
erages and bottles that contain milk or noncarbonated bev-
erages (see dissenting opinion, Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 
lUpra, 623). The question is not whether the bottle contains 
carbonated or noncarbonated beverages, but whether it is safe 
to use for the purpose designed. If a bottle containing milk 
breaks in a customer's hand, the inference of defendant'. 
negligence is no less probable than if a bottle containing a 
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carbonated beverage explodes. In either case the bottle was 
not safe for its proposed use because of some defect from which 
we infer a bottler's negligence in failing to discover it. The 
nature of the beverage adds nothing to this inference. 
In addition," plaintiff's evidence would support a finding 
that Arden failed to reasonably inspect the bottle, violating 
its duty of care. As discussed previously, plaintiff and her 
family did not mistreat the bottle subsequent to its delivery 
by defendant, and what is the corollary, the ~efect was in 
existence prior to plaintiff's handling. Owens established 
that their inspection for latent defects is 95-98 per cent in-
fallible, which plaintiff's expert substantiated, further stating 
that he found no latent defect in the bottle. This evidence 
plus the fact that the bottle was in use for several months by 
Arden sustains a reasonable inference that the bottle had no 
latent defects, and the defect that did exist was a visible one. 
From the foregoing it follows that the defect was one that de-
fendant should have discovered when inspecting the bottles 
and failure to do so constitutes negligent conduct which the 
jury could find proximately caused plaintiff's injury. 
The evidence presented by plaintiff, as indicated above, also 
supports a cause of action predicated on breach of implied 
warranty under section 1735 of the Civil Code. In substance 
section 1735 provides that the seller of goods impliedly war-
rants to the buyer who relies on the seller's skill that the goods 
shall be reasonably fit for the purpose sold or if a sale by 
description the goods are of merchantable quality. Prelimi-
nary to maintaining an action for breach" of warranty the 
California eases require privity,· i.e., the buyer can only sue 
his immediate seller (Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 
682, 695-696 [268 P.2d 1041]), notice (Whitfield v. Jessup, 
31 Ca1.2d 826, 828 [193 P.2d 1]), sale (Mix v. Ingersoll 
Candy Co., 6 Ca1.2d 674, 676 [59 P.2d 144]"), and a reliance 
on the seller's judgment that tll~(goods are fit for the purpose 
sold (Civ. Code, § 1735)._ ,-' 
These prerequisites have been satisfied. It is clear plaintiff 
was in privity with Arden, that proper notice was given and 
that plaintiff relied on Arden's judgment that the bottle was 
·California admits an exception to the privity requirement in eases 
involving foodstuft's· where it is held that an implied warranty of fitness 
for human consumption runs from the manufacturer to the ultimate 
consumer regardless of privity of contract. (Klein v. Duche811 Sandu'ich 
00 .• Ltd., 14 Cal.2d 272 [93 P.2d 799]; Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. 
App.2d 687, 689 [163 P.2d 470].) 
'-~. '-~~' . 
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safe as a container for milk. However, a question does arise 
as to whether there was a sale of the bottle. This has never 
been authoritatively answered in California and there is a 
split among the eases in other jurisdictions that have con-
sidered the question, but the weight of authority is that there 
is a sale of the bottle. In Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co., 127 
Conn. 44 [15 A.2d 181], it was held that the warranty under 
the sales act extends to a returnable beverage container, ruling 
that there had been a sale of the bottle. To the same effect, 
McIntyre v. Kamas City Coca Cola Bottling Co. (Mo.), 85 
F.Supp. 708, 711; Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613 [258 P.2d 
317] ; Mead v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440 [108 
N.E.2d 757]. In two other states, New Jersey and New York, I 
the courts have ruled that in the sale of consumer goods in a 
bottle, the seller warrants the fitness of the container as much 
as the contents on the ground that the container is an essen-
tial part of the transaction, it being immaterial whether the 
bottle is sold with the contents or subject to a refund of de-
posit or return. (Cooper v. Newman, 11 N.Y.S.2d 319; see 
Hea!ey v. Trodd, 124 N.J.L. 64 [11 A.2d 88].) 
The jurisdictions that have denied extending the warranty 
to the container have done so on the grounds either that 
the container was not covered by the act (Poplar v. Hochschild, 
Kohn &- Co., 180 Md. 389 [24 A.2d 783]), or that the Uni-
form Sales Act had not been adopted in their jurisdiction 
(Boter v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co., 200 Okla. 302 
[193 P.2d 575, 4 A.L.R.2d 458]). In the only California 
ease, the court, in dictum, discussed the question in a light 
that does not speak favorably of extending warranty to the 
container (Gerber v. Faber, 54 Cal.App.2d 674, 687-688 [129 
P.2d 485]). However, this ease is by no means conclusive 
and should not operate to prevent this court from considering 
the problem as an original proposition. 
I am persuaded that the more reasoned rule, supported by 
the realities of the situation is that the warranty extends to 
the milk bottle whether returnable or not, there being a "sale" 
of the milk bottle within the meaning of that word as it is 
used in Civil Code, section 1735, when it is delivered to a 
customer. In fact the buyer had no choice but to accept the 
bottles delivered by Arden. They were selected solely by the 
seller for the purpose of containing milk, and placed at the 
buyer's doorstep by Arden's choice alone. Since a container 
is necessary for the sale of milk, Arden in any such sale must 
provide a container suitable for the purpose and the failure 
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to provide such container would render the sale of milk as we 
know it today commercially impossible. Thus, the dairy's sale 
involves the container as much as the milk. The fact the 
bottle may be returned does not prevent there being a "sale" 
of it, for 'returning bottles is not mandatory upon the cus-
tomer, who may keep it in his discretion, but returns it as a 
matter of convenience to himself and the dairy, which in turn 
saves him additional expense in purchasing milk. 
With the preliminary requirements satisfied it is now 
possible to consider whether the evidence would support a 
verdict that there has been a breach of implied warranty. 
This question involves ascertaining what it is that Arden 
impliedly warrants. Plaintiff contends the implied warranty 
is that the bottle is fit for the purpose for which it is supplied, 
namely as a container for milk, and that when a defective 
bottle is placed on the market there is a breach of this war-
ranty, which renders Arden absolutely liable to an immediate 
buyer without proof of negligence for any injury caused by 
the defect. 
Normally it is a policy question whether a particular war-
ranty should be imposed, which imposition requires the court 
to choose a party who is best suited to bear the burden of 
absolute liability in order to protect the consumer who is not 
in a position to do so himself (see concurring opinions, Escola 
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., $upra, 462-464; Gordon v. Aztec 
Brewing Co., supra, 530). Fortunately in this case we are 
aided in our policy decision by a statement of legislative intent 
which strongly suggests that the implied warranty argued for 
is to be applied. This statement is found in section 701 of 
the Agricultural Code and provides in part: "(c) All con-
tainers except single service containers of any kind in which 
milk or any product of milk is kept, stored, transported or 
delivered, shall be sound, smooth, free from rust or open seams 
and at aU times kept in a condition which will permit thorough 
cleansing of all surfaces witp. which the milk or its products 
come in contact. . . ." This section creates a duty on the 
part of all suppliers of milk products to use sound bottles 
and thereby argues powerfully for the proposition that an 
implied warranty in this respect is to be imposed. Certainly 
section 701 permits us to wean ourselves from the belief that 
such a warranty is against traditional practices. Adding to 
the force of the statute, cases where implied warranties have 
been found to exist, such as food cases referred to above, 
and cases involving fitness and strength of component parts 
) 
) 
TRUST v. ARDEN F.AB¥sCo. [50 O.2d 
of machinery (TremeroU v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 102 
Oal.App.2d 464 [227 P.2d 923]) there seems little or ·no 
reason for determining that such a warranty does not exist 
in this case. To the contrary all authority and reason press 
for the application of such a warranty since Arden is in 
the better position to know of the quality of the thing dealt 
with and may forestall any injury to its customers, who 
obviously refre,in from taking protective care in reliance on 
the seller removing all dangers of defective bottles. And 
Jinally as a matter of policy a warranty should be imposed 
on the grounds that "The cost of an injury and the loss of 
time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the 
person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can 
be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the 
public as a cost of doing business." (Concurring opinion, 
E.cola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra, 462.) Arden can be 
held to impliedly warrant, therefore, that all milk bottles 
will be safe for normal use and free from any unreasonable 
dangerous defects; 
To render Arden liable under the warranty theory plain-
tiff must show that the goods were unreasonably dangerous 
either for the use to which they would ordinarily be put or 
for some special use which was brought to the attention of 
the seller, and that the unreasonably dangerous condition 
existed when the goods left the seller's hands (Mu: ·v. Inger-
son Canily Co., npra; Silva v. P. W. W ooZworth Co., 28 Cal. 
App.2d 649 [83 P.2d 76]). The same evidence used to estab-
lish the theories of negligence also may be applied to demon-
strate that there was a defect, which rendered the ordinary 
use of the bottle dangerous, and that it existed prior to plain-
iff's acquisition. Having introduced evidence to support the 
essential elements in a breach of warranty action Arden is 
liable regardless of any proof of negligence. 
Turning to the question of the correctness of the nonsuit 
as to Owens we need discuss only the theories of negligence 
in view of the stipulation pertaining to breach of warranty. 
As far as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is concerned, it 
appears that based upon past experience we cannot say that 
from the breaking of the bottle it is more probable than not 
Owens was negligent. The evidence established that the defect 
was a visible one and not latent, indicating that Owens per-
formed its duty to inspect for latent defects with due care. 
Secondly the bottle was in use for several months after its 
delivery to Arden. The inference from this evidence is that 
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the defect developed sometime after Arden put it to use 
since past experience and common knowledge tell us that if 
the defect that existed at the time of the breaking, existed 
when the bottle was acquired by Arden, the bottle would have 
been broken in Arden's plant or by the first several customers 
using it. Because it did not break the most probable inference 
is that the bottle left Owens free of defects. 
Nor can the res ipsa loquitur doctrine be invoked on the 
ground that plaintiff is in doubt as to which defendant is 
liable. Plaintiff relies on Ybarra v.Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486 
[154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258], and Summers v. Tice, 33 
Cal.2d 80 [199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d 91], but in those cases 
the application of the doctrine was permitted because plain-
tiff was faced with the dilemma of being able to prove a 
negligent act, but unable to prove which of the multiple 
defendants committed the act. In the instant case plaintiff is 
not faced with such dilemma, but is able to show exactly which 
defendant was negligent and what the nature of this negli-
gence was. Under such circumstance plaintiff cannot claim 
multiple defendants justifies invoking the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur. 
As for proving Owens committed specific acts of negligence 
the record is devoid of any evidence which would support 
such a finding. 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed as to defendant Owens, but reversed with 
respect to defendant Arden Farms. 
'!RAYNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-The evidence 
that plaintiff handled the bottle carefully and that the im-
paet causing it to break was only a mild ont' was sufficient 
to apport a finding that it was defective when Ardens Farms 
dt!tivered it to plaintiff. It is reasonable to infer not only that 
this impact occurred when~ plaintiff placed the bottle on the 
dmin board but that it was no more severe than the normal 
impact attending such "'placement. Therefore plaintiff's ex-
pst could justifiably conclude that the bottle was defective 
in lOme way at the time it broke, even though he could not 
delermine the nature of the defect from an examination of 
t1Ie broken bottle. It could reasonably be inferred that no 
oIier member of plaintiff's family handled the bottle, since 
.. was the only one who used skimmed milk and it was her 
catom to identify the bottle of such milk with a rubber band 
.. to set it to one side of the milk-bottle tray in therefrig-
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erator. Conceivably others in the family could have strock 
the other bottles against that one; but that possibility is 
remote given the evidence that no member of the family had 
ever broken a milk bottle. Milk bottles are ordinarily sturdy 
enough to withstand the impacts of normal usage. The bottle 
in question was not, and it is therefore reasonable to conclude 
that it was defective when delivered to plaintiff. (See Gordon 
v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Ca1.2d 514, 532 [203 P.2d 522], 
concurring opinion.) 
Although I believe that there is also sufficient evidence 
of the other elements of a cause of action for breach of war-
ranty, I would emphasize that "The remedies of injured con-
sumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies 
of the law of sales." (Ketterer v. Armour cf; Co., 200 F. 322, 
323; Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd., 14 Ca1.2d 272, 282 
[93 P.2d 799].) Liability should not be determined mechani-
cally by fortuitous circumstances. It should not be controlling 
that the injury occurs after rather than before a sale. (Com-
pare Mead v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440 [108 
N.E.2d 757, 759] [bottle exploded after it was taken from 
vending machine: warranty] with Latlky v. Economy Grocer!l 
Stores, 319 Mass. 224 [65 N.E.2d 305, 307] [bottle exploded 
before customer in self-service store carried it past the check 
stand: no warranty].) It should not be controlling that the 
bottle is sold rather than bailed. (See Cooper v. Newman, 11 
N.Y.S.2d 319, 320; Geddling v. Marsh [1920], 1 K.B. 668, 
672-673.) It should not be controlling that the consumer is 
found to be in privity of contract with the defendant rather 
than not. (See Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd., 14 Cal. 
2d 272 [93 P.2d 799].) The liability of the manufacturer 
should not turn on whether he has "contracted" to assume it 
under such erratic tests that haphazardly afford recovery to 
some and deny it to others. "[P]ublic policy demands t.hat 
responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce 
the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products 
that reach the market." (Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 
24 Ca1.2d 453, 462 [150 P.2d 436], concurring opinion; sec 
2 Harper and James, Torts, pp. 1570 et seq.) 
In the Escola case, as in Gordon v. Aztec Brewi11gCo., 
33 Ca1.2d 514 [203 P.2d 522], the court invoked res ipsa loqui-
tur to affirm judgments for damages resulting from explosions 
of beverage bottles. My own concurrence in those judgments 
rested on the ground that "it should now be recognized that 
a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article 
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that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used 
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury 
to human beings." (24 Ca1.2d at 461.) I adhere to that 
view and. would therefore reverse the judgment of nonsuit 
in favor of Arden Farms in this case. 
Although this court in Burr v. SheruJin W,1liams Co., 42 
Ca1.2d 682, 695-696 [268 P.2d 1041], refused to extend strict 
liability to property damage in the absence of privity of eon-
tract or an express representation of the manufacturer relied 
upo~ by the ultimate purchaser, it has recognized that manu-
facturers are strictly liable to the consumer in eases of food-
stuffs. (Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd., 14 Ca1.2d 272 
[93 P.2d 799].) To date a majority of the court have solved 
the problem of liability for harm caused by defective food 
containers in terms of negligence without considering strict 
liability as an alternative ground of recovery. (Honea v. 
City Dai'l/, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614 [140 P.2d 369]; E.cola v. 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Ca1.2d 453 [150 P.2d 436] ; Gordon 
v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal.2d 514 [203 P,2d 522] ; Zentz v. 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436 [247 P.2d 344].) What-
ever the arguments for limiting the manufacturer's strict lia-
bility to foodstuffs, there is no rational basis for differentiat-
ing between foodstuffs and their containers. (Nichols v. 
Nold, 174 Kan. 613 [258 P.2d 317, 323] ; Cooper v. Newman, 
n N.Y.8.2d 319, 320; Haller v. Rudmann, 249 App.Div. 831 
[292 N.Y.8. 586, 587] ; McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca Cola 
Bottling Co. (Mo), 85 Fed.Supp. 708, 711; Mahoney v. 
Shaker Bgaare Beverages, OhioC. P., 102 N.E.2d 281, 289; 
Geddli"l1 v. Mar.h, [1920] 1 K.B. 668, 672-673; Morelli v. 
Fitch au Gibbon., [1928] 2 K.B. 636, 642-644; see Prosser, 
Torts, ltd ed.] § 84, p. 509.) It would clarify the law to re-
pudiate fllat dUferentiation openly rather than to circumvent 
it covertly and haphazardly by leaving juries free to impose 
strict liability if they so choos~,' under the guise of res ipsa 
loquitur. (See concurring ~pinion in Gordon v. Aztec Brew-
ing Co., 33 Ca1.2d 514,532 [203 P.2d 522], and ca.c;es citc:d.) 
There ill no evidence that the bottle was defective when 
it was &livered to Arden Farms by Owens-Illinois. Since 
it withstGod usage by Arden Farms and its cusiomers for 
many DIOIlths, the only reasonable inference is that it was 
not defettive when Owens-Illinois delivered it to Arden 
Farms. The nonsuit in favor of Owens-Illinois was therefore 
proper 1IIlder any theory of liability. I would therefore affirm 
') 
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the judgment as to defendant Owens-Illinois and reverse it as 
to defendant Arden Farms. 
GIBSON, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.-It is clear 
that, as to Owens, the judgment of nonsuit should be affirmed. 
Th.e parties stipulated that plaintiff had no cause of action 
against Owens for breach of warranty, and she failed to make 
a prima facie case against this defendant based on negligence. 
Although there is substantial evidence that the breaking of the 
bottle resulted from a defect in it, there is no evidence from 
which it can be inferred that this defect was present when 
the bottle was delivered by Owens to Arden, who thereafter 
used it for several months before it broke. 
With respect to Arden, however, I am of the vi('w that the 
judgment of nonsuit should be rt'versed, because the evidence 
is not insufficient as a matter of law to sustain plaintiff's 
cause of action for breach of warranty. As shown by the 
discussion in the concurring and dissenting opinions I)f Jus-
tices Carter and Traynor, there is testimony from which t11(' 
jury could reasonably infer that the bottle was not improperly 
handled in plaintiff's home and that when th(' bottle was 
delivered by Arden it contained a defect which caused it to 
break. If an inference to that effect were drawn by the 
jury, the defect in the bottle would constitute a· breach of 
warranty by Arden under section 1735 of the Civil Cod(' 
(Uniform Sales Act, § 15), which reads in part: "SUbject 
to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that behalf, 
there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality 
or :fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under 
a contract·to sell or a sale, except as follows: (1) Where the 
buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller 
the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and 
it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judg-
ment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), 
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reason-
ably :fit for such purpose. (2) Where the goods are bought 
by description from a seller who deals in goods of that de-
scription (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), 
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of mer-
chantable quality." (Italics added.) 
Section 1735 does not refer merely to goods sold but to all 
IC goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale." It has 
been held that when bottled beverages are sold, the bottles 
in which they necessarily must be delivered are supplied 
"nder the contract of sale within the meaning of the statute 
) 
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although the bottles are bailed rather than sold. (GeddUng v. 
Marsh (1920), 1 K.B. 668; see 1 Williston on Sales (rev. 
ed. 1948),582, n. 1.) The Geddling ease related to a sale of 
"lime juice and soda" in bailed bottles and was decided under 
section 14 of the English Sale of Goods Act, 1893, which 
contains provisions nearly identical with those quoted above 
from section 1735. The findings in that case showed that the 
sale came within the first subdivision of the section, but the 
reasoning of the court is equally applicable to a sale coming 
within the second subdivision. Accordingly, ·even if we 
assume that the bottle involved here was bailed, it would be 
subject to any warranty which would be applicable under 
either of the quoted subdivisions if the bottle had been sold. 
The sale of a bottle of milk by a dairy under the circum-
stances appearing here clearly comes within the language of 
the second subdivision of the statute, and the seller's implied 
warranty of merchantable quality under this provision in-
cludes a warranty that his product is reasonably fit for the 
general purpose for which goods of that kind are sold. (See 
Simmons v. Rhodes ([; Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal.2d 190, 194 [293 
P.2d 26] ; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co.,42 Cal.2d 682, 694 
(268 P.2d 1041].) It is obvious that a milk bottle which is so 
defective that it will break under normal handling is not 
fit for the ordinary use for which it was intended and that 
the delivery of such a defective bottle constitutes a breach of 
warranty. 
The buyer may recover for breach of the statutory warranty 
without proving negligence on the part of the seller. (Trem-
eroU v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 102 Cal.App.2d 464, 475 
[227 P.2d 923] ; Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal.App.2d 687, 
689 [163 P.2d 470]; 1 Williston on Sales (rev. ed. 1948), 
617.) Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider in this 
dissent whether the evidence is sufficient to support a judg-
ment upon the theory that Arde.n was negligent. Likewise 
it is not necessary to discuss whet.herour decision in Honea v. 
City Dairy, Inc., 22 Ca1.2d '614 [140 P.2d 369], precludes 
resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under the evidence 
presented here. 
I would affirm the judgment with respect to Owens and 
reverse it with respect to Arden. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 21, 
1958. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
